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Mathematica Policy Research 
Alberto Martini
Universitá del Piemonte Orientale
Title I of WIA is the largest source of federally funded employment 
services in the United States. Its purpose is to increase the employment, 
job retention, and earnings of its participants. WIA funds the Dislocated 
Workers, Adult, and Youth programs, as well as Job Corps—a primarily 
residential training program for disadvantaged youth—and specifi c pro-
grams for Native Americans, migrant and seasonal farm workers, and 
veterans. In fi scal year 2008, $4.5 billion was spent on WIA programs.
The European Social Fund (ESF) provides funding to promote em-
ployment in the 27 member states of the European Union (EU). Over 
the seven years of the current funding cycle (2007–2013), ESF will fund 
$114 billion in services, accounting for about 10 percent of the total EU 
budget. ESF has many important similarities to WIA. They are both 
large and decentralized. WIA allows state and local workforce invest-
ment areas to shape their programs. ESF funds are allocated to member 
states, which funnel the funds to one or more operational programs, 
which in turn have the ability to fund a wide variety of programs and 
services at the local level. A similar wide range of services are funded 
by both WIA and ESF, including counseling, job search assistance, ba-
sic education, vocational training, support services, retention services, 
and entrepreneurial assistance. Services under both WIA and ESF are 
provided by both government and nongovernment agencies, including 
small community-based organizations.
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Given the considerable amount spent on employment services in 
both the United States and Europe, policymakers, participants, taxpay-
ers, and program administrators on both continents want to know which 
services are effective. For more than three decades, the USDOL has 
invested heavily in conducting rigorous impact evaluations of its em-
ployment programs. In the past decade alone, it has funded experimental 
evaluations of Job Corps, approaches to administering training vouch-
ers, entrepreneurial services, and prisoner reentry programs. (Benus et 
al. 2008, McConnell et al. 2006, and Schochet et al. 2008. The experi-
mental evaluation of prisoner reentry programs is being conducted by 
Social Policy Research Associates and MDRC.) The USDOL has also 
funded nonexperimental evaluations of the WIA Adult and Dislocated 
worker programs and the Trade and Adjustment Assistance (TAA) 
program (Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske 2008). The nonexperimental 
evaluation of TAA is being conducted by Social Policy Research Asso-
ciates and Mathematica Policy Research. Recently, the USDOL funded 
a nationally representative experimental evaluation of the WIA Adult 
and Dislocated Worker programs that is in its design phase.1 Although 
the EU does sponsor evaluations of its operational programs, much less 
emphasis is placed on impact evaluations. And as noted by Greenberg 
and Shroder (2004), very few experimental evaluations have been con-
ducted on employment programs outside the United States.
The purpose of this chapter is to inform EU offi cials about some of 
the lessons learned from conducting impact evaluations of employment 
programs in the United States. It begins by describing the role evalua-
tions have played in decisions about employment policy and programs. 
It then discusses the three key main steps in any evaluation: 1) choosing 
the policy-relevant evaluation questions, 2) choosing the best design, 
and 3) collecting data. The chapter concludes with a summary of our 
recommendations.    
EVALUATION CAN AFFECT POLICY AND
PROGRAMMATIC DECISIONS
Information on the effectiveness of employment services is needed 
for three main reasons. First, because a considerable amount of gov-
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ernment funds is invested in employment services, taxpayers need 
information on the investment’s return. Second, most people in need 
of employment services are vulnerable and disadvantaged, so it is par-
ticularly important that the services offered to them are helpful. Third, a 
workforce with the skills required by employers is critical for the con-
tinued growth of the economy. As discussed below, evidence on service 
effectiveness has led the U.S. Congress to fund new programs, expand 
existing programs, and reduce funding for others. Evaluation fi ndings 
have also been used by program administrators to improve programs.
An example of an evaluation that led to a new program is the New 
Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration sponsored by the USDOL in 
the 1980s (Corson et al. 1989). The demonstration involved targeting 
UI recipients who were likely to have diffi culty becoming employed 
and randomly assigning them to four groups: 1) a treatment group that 
received job search assistance, 2) a treatment group that received job 
search assistance and training or relocation assistance, 3) a treatment 
group that received job search assistance with a cash bonus for early 
reemployment, and 4) a control group that received no services or bo-
nuses. The evaluation of the demonstration found that compared to the 
control, all three treatments led to increased earnings and employment 
and to benefi ts to society and claimants that outweighed their costs. 
As a result of this evaluation, in 1993 Congress required all states to 
establish a Worker Profi ling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) sys-
tem that identifi es UI recipients who are likely to exhaust their benefi ts 
before they fi nd employment and requires these UI recipients to receive 
reemployment services (Reich 1997). 
Another example of the funding of a program based on research 
evidence occurred at about the same time. In the late 1980s, the USDOL 
funded the UI Self-Employment Demonstration in Massachusetts and 
Washington to help UI recipients start their own businesses by offer-
ing fi nancial assistance and workshops on issues related to business 
start-up. The generally positive fi ndings from an evaluation of these 
demonstrations (Benus et al. 1995) led to the 1993 legislation to estab-
lish the Self-Employment Assistance program for UI recipients.
Congress has also expanded funding for existing programs found 
to be effective. A nonexperimental evaluation of Job Corps conducted 
in the 1970s found that the program increased employment and earn-
ings and was cost-effective for society and for the participants (Mallar 
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et al. 1982). Following these fi ndings, Congress increased funding for 
Job Corps. 
While program designers and administrators nearly always ar-
dently believe their programs are effective, rigorous evaluations have 
sometimes found that they are wrong. For example, an experimental 
evaluation of the youth program under JTPA found that overall the pro-
gram had no signifi cant impact on earnings for youth and may even 
have had negative impacts on male youth who had been arrested prior 
to random assignment (Bloom et al. 1997). The fi ndings from this study 
led Congress to reduce funding for the JTPA youth program and sub-
sequently require major changes in the youth program when JTPA was 
replaced with WIA. 
Evaluation fi ndings have also been used by program administrators 
to improve programs. The Job Corps program examined the services 
it provided Hispanic youth after the National Job Corps Study found 
that the program did not increase earnings for this population of youth 
(Schochet, Burghardt, and McConnell 2008). A study of different ap-
proaches to providing training vouchers, called individual training 
accounts, found that, contrary to the fears of program staff, the recipi-
ents of the vouchers made similar training and employment choices 
irrespective of whether they were required to be counseled by an em-
ployment counselor at the One-Stop Career Center (McConnell et al. 
2006). This has direct implications for the administration of vouchers. 
CAREFUL DEVELOPMENT OF EVALUATION QUESTIONS
The fi rst step in any evaluation is to carefully specify what policy-
makers want to learn from the evaluation. Although most evaluations 
involve considerable exploratory analysis, an evaluation can usually 
only address a few questions rigorously. Hence, it is important to design 
the evaluation so that the questions it does ask are the ones that are most 
helpful to policymakers. 
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EVALUATING THE ENTIRE PROGRAM OR
PROGRAM COMPONENTS
In many cases, the most policy-relevant question is not whether an 
entire program is effective but rather which program components are 
effective. Evaluating an entire program is appropriate if policymakers 
are considering whether to fund the program or the program consists 
of only a few key components. Congress has asked for evaluations of 
entire programs, such as the Job Corps and JTPA programs. When the 
programs are large and comprised of many diverse components, such 
as WIA and ESF, policymakers are unlikely to stop funding the entire 
program, but they do want to know which components of the program 
are effective. In these cases, evaluating specifi c program components 
is more informative. For example, the USDOL’s nonexperimental WIA 
evaluation did not attempt to evaluate the entire program but focused 
on evaluating just the Adult and Dislocated Worker programs, which 
are large but not the only programs funded by WIA (Heinrich, Mueser, 
and Troske 2008). 
If individuals choose which service component to receive, care 
must be taken in interpreting impacts by program component. The im-
pact estimates pertain only to the people who chose that component and 
not to all study participants. During the design phase of the National 
Job Corps Study, program administrators expressed interest in not only 
the effectiveness of the entire program but also in the effectiveness of 
the nonresidential component of the program. Most participating youth 
live at a Job Corps center, but some youth choose to live at home and 
commute to the center (and are referred to as nonresidents). The study 
found that both the residential and nonresidential components of Job 
Corps had positive impacts (Schochet and Burghardt 2007; Scho-
chet, Burghardt, and McConnell 2008). However, as nonresidential 
and residential youth differ, it cannot be concluded that the nonresi-
dential program is effective for those youth who chose the residential 
component. 
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DETERMINING FOR WHOM THE PROGRAM IS EFFECTIVE
Some programs and policies are effective for some people but not 
for others. In the design phase of the evaluation, policymakers should 
specify which target populations are of policy interest. The JTPA evalu-
ation, for example, focused on four groups with different employment 
needs—adult women, adult men, young women, and young men. The 
National Job Corps Study estimated the impacts for youth in three dif-
ferent age groups—16–17, 18–19, and 20–24. The choice of estimating 
impacts for youth by age was motivated by conversations with Job 
Corps staff who viewed younger participants as much more diffi cult to 
serve than the older youth. 
It is important to decide on the target populations that are of policy 
interest prior to conducting the evaluation for two reasons. First, the size 
of the target populations will affect the required sample size. Estimating 
impacts for subgroups requires a larger sample, and the required sample 
is larger the smaller the subgroup. Second, it avoids the temptation to 
estimate impacts for numerous subgroups and interpret any signifi cant 
impact as a true program effect. If a large number of subgroup impacts 
are estimated, the estimate of the program impact for some subgroup is 
likely to be signifi cantly positive by chance and may not refl ect a true 
positive program impact (Schochet 2009a). Statistical adjustments can 
be made to account for estimating multiple subgroups, but these adjust-
ments result in a loss of statistical power, with the loss increasing with 
the number of subgroups. 
DETERMINING THE COUNTERFACTUAL
Perhaps the greatest challenge in designing evaluation questions is 
to determine the counterfactual—the scenario against which the inter-
vention is tested. Evaluations in which the counterfactual is the absence 
of all employment services are rare or nonexistent. WIA is not the 
only source of employment services in the United States—people can 
receive training at a community college funded by a Pell grant, for ex-
ample. Similarly, the ESF is not the only source of employment services 
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in European countries. Hence, if people do not receive employment 
services from WIA or the ESF, they may receive services from other 
sources. In the National JTPA Study, for example, about 40 percent of 
the control group received some employment services not funded by 
JTPA (Bloom et al. 1997). 
It may be that a counterfactual in which other employment services 
can be received is the more appropriate one. Such an evaluation pro-
vides policymakers information about the effectiveness of additional 
WIA funding in the real world, a world in which other services exist. 
The estimated impact of employment services in these cases is likely to 
be smaller because it is based on the impact of additional services, not 
the impact of receiving services versus no services. Hence the estimated 
impact of the JTPA services was not the impact of receiving the services 
versus no services, but the impact of more treatment group members 
receiving services. Correct interpretation of the impacts requires infor-
mation about the receipt of services by both the treatment and control/
comparison groups. 
IMPACT EVALUATION DESIGN: CONSTRUCTING
A COMPARISON GROUP
An ideal evaluation of employment services would compare the 
outcomes of people who receive the services with the outcomes of 
the same people who do not. As this is impossible, the challenge is to 
choose another set of people—a comparison group—who are as similar 
as possible to the people who receive the services. Under an experi-
ment, this comparison group is determined randomly and is referred to 
as a control group. In nonexperimental evaluations, other approaches 
are used to construct a comparison group. Below, we describe the con-
siderations in choosing an evaluation design.
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EXPERIMENTS
Experiments involve randomly assigning individuals to two or more 
groups, with each group offered a different set of services. When imple-
mented carefully, random assignment creates groups of individuals that, 
on average, have identical observable and nonobservable characteris-
tics prior to the intervention, differing only in the program services they 
are offered. As a result, the great advantage of experimental designs is 
that differences in average outcomes between the groups can be caus-
ally attributed to the specifi c interventions under investigation. Under 
other designs, there is always a concern that the differences in outcomes 
are a result of differences in the underlying characteristics between the 
group receiving the intervention and the comparison group (or between 
the groups receiving different interventions). 
The fundamental and unavoidable challenge of experiments is that 
they require that some people are offered more or different services 
than others. This may be politically challenging and often is resisted 
by program administrators. Yet, numerous social service experiments 
have been conducted successfully in the United States and developing 
countries.2 To be successful, the evaluator needs to obtain political sup-
port for the study and minimize the burden on the program and study 
participants.   
Experiments are often more acceptable politically and to pro-
gram administrators when they are used to evaluate a demonstration 
or a pilot of an intervention rather than an existing program. In these 
cases, control group members receive the services they would in the 
absence of the experiment and treatment group members receive more 
services. The USDOL has supported numerous experimental evalua-
tions of demonstrations, including the National Supported Work (NSW) 
Demonstration (Maynard et al. 1979), a series of UI job search assis-
tance and bonus experiments (Corson et al. 1989, 1992; Spiegelman, 
O’Leary, and Kline 1992; Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987), the Indi-
vidual Training Account Experiment (McConnell et al. 2006), and the 
recent evaluation of Project GATE (Growing America through Entre-
preneurship) (Benus et al. 2008).
If the roll-out of new programs takes place over time, an experi-
ment can be conducted if the order at which potential sites receive the 
Neither Easy Nor Cheap   455
program is determined randomly. In this case early implementation sites 
are the treatment sites and the later implementation sites are the control 
sites, at least until program implementation. This design requires a large 
number of sites to ensure enough statistical power due to the clustering 
of individuals within sites. While we do not know of an example of this 
design in evaluating employment service, it has been used extensively 
in education evaluations—schools have been randomly assigned to ei-
ther receive funding for an intervention immediately or receive future 
funding for the intervention (see, for example, Glazerman et al. [2007]). 
Evaluating existing programs experimentally is more diffi cult 
because the experiments lead to some people not participating or re-
ceiving fewer services than they would in the absence of the evaluation. 
The control group may also lead to empty slots at the program. The 
best conditions for an experiment occur when there is excess demand 
for the program. With a surplus of people wanting to participate in the 
program, the existence of a control group could affect who receives the 
intervention but not the number of people who received the interven-
tion, and thus, the program would not suffer from empty slots. This was 
the case in an evaluation of Upward Bound, a program to assist dis-
advantaged youth to prepare for, enter, and succeed in college (Seftor 
et al. 2009). The program recruited enough students that the treatment 
group could fi ll all program slots and the control group was placed on 
a waiting list. If any openings in the program occurred, they were fi lled 
by selecting students randomly off the waiting list. 
Experiments are also more acceptable when the research groups 
are offered different treatments, so that all study participants receive 
some services. In an evaluation of individual training accounts, people 
who were found eligible for the vouchers were assigned to three groups 
that varied in the extent to which counseling was required and the role 
the counselor played in setting the amount of the voucher (McConnell 
et al. 2006). No one was denied a voucher, and anyone could receive 
counseling by requesting it, even if they were in the group for which 
counseling was not mandatory. 
Randomized encouragement is another experimental evaluation ap-
proach that does not involve denial of services. Under this design, both 
treatment and control group members can receive the intervention, but 
the treatment group is given additional encouragement to receive the 
intervention. This encouragement can take the form of information, fi -
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nancial, or other incentives, but the encouragement must not directly 
affect the outcomes of interest. While we know of no study of employ-
ment services that has used randomized encouragement, it has been 
used to evaluate the effectiveness of health interventions such as the 
infl uenza vaccine (Hirano et al. 2000).  
Cooperation from program staff is a prerequisite for a careful im-
plementation of an experiment, and so evaluators need to obtain support 
for the study from program staff at all levels, and then train and monitor 
them. Most program staff will support an evaluation if they understand 
that the fi ndings will be used to inform the development of effective 
employment services. Staff must also understand the rationale behind 
an experiment and the drawbacks of alternative designs. 
Evaluators should work with program staff to fi nd ways to reduce 
the burden of the experiment to the program and participants. The 
Web-based random assignment systems used in recent experimental 
evaluations (such as the evaluation of a relationship-skills program, 
Building Strong Families) mean that program staff can learn the re-
search assignment of a program applicant almost instantaneously rather 
than having to wait a few days before knowing the assignment. Another 
way to reduce the burden on program and participants is to have small 
control groups. The National Job Corps Study, for example, had control 
groups that were only 7 percent of all eligible Job Corps applicants 
(Schochet et al. 2008). 
It can be challenging to estimate the impact of service components 
in an experiment because of a lack of information on which services the 
control group would receive. It is sometimes possible to ask program 
staff to predict prior to random assignment which services each sample 
member would receive if they were assigned to the treatment group. If 
the predictions are accurate, an estimate of the impact can be obtained 
by comparing the outcomes of those members of the treatment and con-
trol groups who are predicted to receive the services. This approach 
was used successfully in the National Job Corps Study to estimate the 
separate impacts of the residential and nonresidential services (Scho-
chet et al. 2008). 
A major drawback of experiments is that they cannot provide poli-
cymakers quick answers. The National Job Corps Study began in 1993; 
the last evaluation report was published over a decade later in 2006. It 
takes considerable time for an experiment to provide fi ndings for three 
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reasons. First, it takes some time to obtain political and program sup-
port for the evaluation. Second, it takes time for enough eligible people 
to request the services and be randomly assigned. Typical sample intake 
periods are one or two years. Third, as many programs are designed to 
have long-term effects, follow-up data collection needs to occur for a 
lengthy period after participants enter the program. The total follow-up 
period for the participants in the Job Corps Study was 48 months for 
survey data and 8–10 years for administrative data. 
It is often said that experiments are more expensive than other 
evaluation designs (Levitan 1992). Some costs that are incurred for ex-
periments but not nonexperimenal evaluations include recruiting sites, 
training staff, conducting random assignment, and monitoring. In prac-
tice, experiments can be very expensive—some have cost millions of 
dollars. However, it is not clear that this is because they are experiments 
or because experiments often involve surveys while many nonexperi-
mental evaluations rely only on less costly administrative data. Yet, the 
type of data collected is unrelated to the design—experiments can be 
conducted with administrative data, and nonexperimental evaluations 
can include survey data collection. Rigorous nonexperimental evalu-
ations require more detailed baseline data. More research is needed to 
compare the costs of experimental and nonexperimental designs, hold-
ing constant data collection costs. 
NONEXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS
It is not always possible to conduct experiments. Experiments are 
typically not feasible for evaluating entitlement programs (because 
program services cannot be denied to eligible program applicants, 
thereby making it impossible to create control groups), and may not 
be appropriate for evaluating existing employment-related programs 
that are undersubscribed. It may also not be feasible to create control 
groups if there is no way of restricting program services (for example, 
reemployment services that are obtained by computer in one’s home). 
Furthermore, experiments cannot be conducted using retrospective 
treatment samples (that is, past program participants who are identifi ed 
using administrative program data) or treatment samples selected using 
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secondary data (for example, using large national survey data). Fi-
nally, even if random assignment is feasible, program staff may refuse 
to participate in the experiment because of ethical concerns about re-
stricting services to program applicants and the extra burden associated 
with implementing random assignment procedures (such as obtaining 
study consent forms, collecting additional customer information that is 
required for random assignment, notifying customers about random as-
signment results, and so on). 
Consequently, researchers often use nonexperimental methods to 
estimate program impacts. In this section, we briefl y discuss two key 
features of two nonexperimental methods that are becoming increas-
ingly popular for evaluating employment and training programs: 1) 
regression discontinuity (RD) methods and 2) propensity score match-
ing methods. We do not discuss pre–post designs where the outcomes of 
program participants are compared before and after program participa-
tion, because of obvious confounding factors that could bias the impact 
estimates (such as changes in economic conditions or participant’s 
health status). In addition, we do not discuss instrumental variables 
methods, because it is often diffi cult to fi nd defensible instruments that 
are strongly correlated with the decision to participate in an employ-
ment or training program, but that are uncorrelated with the disturbance 
terms that infl uence key postprogram outcomes (such as employment 
and earnings).3 We conclude this section with a discussion of the avail-
able evidence on the validity of these methods.
REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY DESIGNS
RD designs are increasingly used by researchers to obtain unbiased 
estimates of intervention effects in the social policy area (see, for exam-
ple, Cook [2008], Schochet [2009b], and Imbens and Lemieux [2008] 
for reviews). These designs are applicable when a continuous “scor-
ing” rule is used to assign the program, policy, or other intervention to 
people or other study units (for example, One-Stop Career Centers). 
People or units with scores above a preset cutoff value are assigned to 
the treatment group and units with scores below the cutoff value are 
assigned to the comparison group, or vice versa. For example, Black, 
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Galdo, and Smith (2007) estimate the impacts of the WPRS system in 
the state of Kentucky using the rule that UI recipients are required to 
receive reemployment services if their model-based UI profi ling scores 
are larger than a cutoff value. As another example, the effects of pro-
viding competitive grants to workforce investment areas for One-Stop 
Career Center innovations could be estimated using grant application 
scores and collecting data on a random sample of workers in both the 
winning and losing grantee sites.
Under an RD design, the effect of an intervention can be estimated 
as the difference in mean outcomes between treatment and compari-
son group units, adjusting statistically for the relationship between the 
outcomes and the variable used to assign people or other units to the 
intervention, typically referred to as the “forcing” variable. A regression 
line (or curve) is fi t for the treatment group and similarly for the com-
parison group, and the difference in average outcomes between these 
lines at the cutoff value of the forcing variable is the estimate of the 
effect of the intervention; an impact occurs if there is a “discontinuity” 
between the two regression lines at the cutoff. 
RD designs generate unbiased estimates of the effect of an inter-
vention if the relationship between the outcome and forcing variable 
can be modeled correctly (using parametric, local linear, or other non-
parametric methods, and using appropriate score bandwidths), and 
the forcing variable was not systematically manipulated to infl uence 
treatment assignments. Furthermore, the forcing variable must be 
reasonably continuous, and should not be binary (such as gender) or 
categorical with no natural ordering (like race). In addition, the cutoff 
value for the forcing variable must not be used to assign people or other 
units to interventions other than the one being tested. This requirement 
is necessary to ensure that the study can isolate the causal effects of the 
tested intervention from the effects of other interventions.
 Well-planned RD designs can yield unbiased impact estimates, and 
may be easier to sell to program staff and participants than experimental 
designs because treatment assignments are determined by rules devel-
oped by program staff or policymakers rather than randomly. However, 
RD designs cannot necessarily be viewed as a substitute for experimen-
tal designs. Sample sizes typically need to be about three to four times 
larger under RD than experimental designs to achieve impact estimates 
with the same levels of precision (Schochet 2009b). The estimate of the 
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impact under the RD design typically pertains to a narrower population 
(those with scores near the cutoff) than under an experimental design 
(those with a broader range of scores). Furthermore, the RD design re-
quires critical modeling assumptions that are not required under the 
experimental design.
PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING METHODS
Propensity score methods involve matching program participants 
to a comparison sample of people using available data on demographic 
characteristics, earnings histories, and local area characteristics. The 
best data source for selecting comparison samples will depend on the 
specifi c application and study research questions, but options often in-
clude administrative records (such as UI claims data), program data 
on ineligible program applicants or eligible applicants who decide not 
to participate in the studied program, program data for workers who 
are eligible for a related but less-intensive program to the one under 
investigation, and national surveys that cover the same time period as 
the treatment sample data and that include comparable matching vari-
ables. In all cases, the outcomes of the comparison group are intended 
to represent the outcomes of the treatment group had they not received 
the program services under investigation. The relevant counterfactual 
for the study, however, will often depend on the specifi c data source.   
Under comparison-group designs, assumptions and statistical mod-
els must eliminate differences between the treatment and comparison 
group samples that could result from sources other than the inter-
vention. If these efforts are successful, remaining differences can be 
attributed to the intervention, possibly with some measure of statistical 
confi dence. However, if sources of unmeasured differences exist, this 
approach could produce impact estimates that suffer from sample selec-
tion biases. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) developed a statistical proce-
dure—propensity scoring—to select a matched comparison group. A 
propensity score is the probability that a worker with a given set of 
characteristics receives the treatment. Rosenbaum and Rubin proved 
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the key result that individuals with the same propensity score will also 
have the same distribution of the matching variables. 
Several methods can be used to perform the matching, such as near-
est neighbor, caliper, or kernel methods. Smith and Todd (2005a) and 
Imbens and Wooldridge (2008) conclude that with suffi cient sample 
overlap in the propensity scores and well-balanced matching variable 
distributions, impact estimates are relatively insensitive to the choice 
of matching methods. It is critical that the adequacy of the matching 
process be assessed, for example, by comparing the distribution of the 
matching variables and propensity scores of treatment and selected 
comparison group members within propensity score classes.
Several recent large-scale evaluations of employment and training 
programs have used propensity score matching methods that were struc-
tured to satisfy the conditions discussed above for obtaining credible 
impact estimates. For example, Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske (2008) 
estimate the impacts of WIA on the combined effects of core and inten-
sive services relative to no WIA services and the incremental effect of 
WIA-funded training relative to WIA participants who did not receive 
training. The comparison group for their analysis was drawn from UI 
claimants or from ES participants in the 12 study states. The data used 
for propensity score matching were obtained from UI claims data, ES 
data, and WIA program data, and included employment histories, labor 
force status at the time of program entry, demographic characteristics 
(gender, age, race and ethnicity, education attained, veteran status, and 
welfare receipt), and local labor market characteristics.     
As another example, a national evaluation of the TAA program is 
employing a propensity score matching design (Schochet 2005). The 
large TAA program provides training, extended UI benefi ts, and other 
employment-related services to workers who are displaced from their 
jobs due to trade-related reasons. A random assignment design was not 
feasible for the evaluation—because TAA services cannot be denied to 
eligible workers and so under program rules, it would not be possible to 
construct a control group. Furthermore, it was not feasible to randomly 
assign participants to different service groups, because TAA services 
are voluntary and are tailored to meet the needs of individual clients. 
Consequently, the evaluation is employing a comparison group design 
to obtain estimated impacts, where the comparison group was selected 
using UI claims data from the 26 study states, and using similar match-
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ing variables to those described above for the Heinrich, Mueser, and 
Troske study.
THE VALIDITY OF NONEXPERIMENTAL METHODS
There is a long-standing debate in the literature about whether 
social programs can be reliably evaluated using nonexperimental meth-
ods. To investigate their validity, data from experiments have been used 
to try to replicate the experimental estimates—the “gold-standard” esti-
mates—using nonexperimental methods.
In an infl uential study, LaLonde (1986) fi nds that the impact results 
from the experimental NSW Demonstration could not be replicated us-
ing a comparison group design. He estimates program impacts using 
a number of standard nonexperimental evaluation econometric meth-
ods, including simple regression methods, difference-in-difference 
methods, instrumental variable procedures, and the two-step estimator 
of Heckman (1979), and fi nds that the alternative estimators produced 
very different impact results. Fraker and Maynard (1987) came to 
similarly pessimistic conclusions using a slightly different comparison 
sample. Similarly, Peikes, Moreno, and Orzol (2008) fi nd that match-
ing methods produced incorrect impact estimates when compared with 
a randomized design for the State Partnership Initiative employment 
promotion program. 
Using the same data as LaLonde, however, Heckman and Hotz 
(1989) use a broader set of specifi cation tests to help select among non-
experimental estimators, and fi nd that their tests could exclude those 
estimators that produced impact results that differed from the experi-
mental ones. A key specifi cation test that they used was that a credible 
estimator should yield no differences between the treatment and com-
parison groups in their mean outcomes pertaining to the preintervention 
period.    
In an infl uential study, Dehejia and Wahba (1999) reexamine 
LaLonde’s data using propensity scoring to fi nd matched comparison 
group members for the NSW treatment group; their resulting impact 
estimates were similar to the experimental ones. A key contribution 
of their study was the careful use of model specifi cation tests that 
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yielded treatment and comparison groups with similar distributions 
of the matching variables and propensity scores. Mueser, Troske, and 
Gorislavsky (2007) also conclude using JTPA data that matching meth-
ods may be effective in evaluating job training programs. Smith and 
Todd (2005a,b) caution, however, that the Dehejia and Wahba results 
are not robust to alternative analysis samples and matching variables 
included in their models. 
Glazerman, Levy, and Myers (2003) survey 16 studies that each 
used nonexperimental methods to try to replicate impact fi ndings from 
a social experiment. Their systematic review was intended to shed light 
on the conditions under which nonexperimental methods most closely 
approximate impact results from well-designed and well-executed 
experimental studies. They fi nd that nonexperimental methods occa-
sionally replicate the fi ndings from experimental impact evaluations, 
but in ways that are not easy to predict. However, they identify several 
factors that lead to more successful replications. These factors, which 
are similar to the ones that Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998) 
fi nd in trying to replicate experimental results from the National JTPA 
Study, are as follows: the data should include a rich set of matching vari-
ables relevant to modeling the program participation decision, and in 
particular, preprogram earnings histories; the same data sources should 
be used for the treatment and comparison groups; and the treatment and 
comparison samples should be from the same geographic areas. Bloom, 
Michalopoulos, and Hill (2005) identify similar criteria for increasing 
the chances that nonexperimental methods can produce credible impact 
estimates. 
Studies have shown that the RD approach has promise for evaluat-
ing employment and training programs when experimental methods are 
not viable. Cook, Shadish, and Wong (2008) provide empirical evidence 
that impact estimates based on RD designs can replicate experimental 
estimates in a range of settings. The advantage of the RD approach 
relative to the propensity score comparison group approach is that the 
selection rule for receiving the treatment is fully known under the RD 
approach and can be used to obtain unbiased estimates if the outcome-
score relationship can be modeled correctly. In contrast, the propensity 
score approach assumes that the program participation decision can be 
adequately modeled using observable baseline data, which is typically 
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very diffi cult to test, suggesting that one never knows for sure whether 
unobservable factors bias the impact fi ndings. 
COLLECTING THE NECESSARY DATA
Data on outcomes need to be collected for both the treatment and 
control/comparison groups. These data can be obtained from surveys or 
from administrative records. Much more complete and detailed infor-
mation can be obtained from surveys than is typically available from 
administrative databases. Surveys can also collect details that may sug-
gest a job’s quality, such as the receipt of fringe benefi ts, union status, 
and wage rates. Data on criminal activity, substance abuse, and receipt 
of a wide range of services are often not available from sources other 
than surveys. 
On the other hand, administrative data do not suffer from recall 
error or nonresponse bias. And because they are much cheaper than 
survey data to collect, they can provide data on many more study partic-
ipants over a longer period of time. However, they are more limited in 
the variables they include and may miss some jobs. In the United States, 
state UI agencies collect quarterly earnings from all people covered by 
UI, and these data are often used to evaluate employment programs. 
These data, however, do not cover federal employment, jobs not cov-
ered by UI (such as self-employment or agricultural jobs), or any jobs 
that employees or employers do not want reported. Hotz and Scholz 
(2001) estimate that these data may understate employment by about 13 
percent. In the United States, Social Security data are another potential 
source of administrative data on earnings, which are sometimes used 
in impact evaluations. These data do cover federal and self-employed 
workers and cover all states, but are annual rather than quarterly.
Baseline data—or data collected prior to the receipt of the inter-
vention—are essential for implementing nonexperimental designs. 
For example, detailed data on the baseline characteristics of both 
participants and nonparticipants are required to construct a matched 
comparison group design. While baseline data are not essential for ex-
periments, they are useful for ensuring that random assignment created 
research groups with similar baseline characteristics. Irrespective of the 
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design, baseline data are also necessary for defi ning subgroups of in-
terest, adjusting for baseline differences in the treatment and control/
comparison groups due to sampling error, and testing and adjusting for 
survey nonresponse bias. Finally, baseline data on program participants 
are useful for describing those who receive the intervention. 
Baseline data can be collected from administrative records, ap-
plication forms, or surveys. In some studies, study-specifi c forms are 
administered to experiment participants, who typically need to be 
administered a consent form prior to random assignment. A form re-
questing additional baseline and contact information (to aid follow-up 
of the participant) can be administered at the same time.
Data on the receipt of services is needed to understand differences 
between the receipt of services by the treatment and control/comparison 
groups and hence the interventions and counterfactuals being tested. 
Program participants will likely vary in the intensity of the services 
received. And, as discussed above, study participants in both the treat-
ment and control/comparison groups may also receive services from 
other programs. 
The program is likely to be able to provide detailed and accurate 
data on service receipt among program participants. (Program admin-
istrators may need assistance in collecting these data.) However, these 
data are typically not available for the control/comparison group. Data 
on the service receipt of the control/comparison group are often un-
available from administrative records and hence need to be collected 
using a survey. 
Correctly interpreting estimates of program effectiveness requires 
an understanding of the program as it is actually implemented, rather 
than how it is designed. This understanding requires an “implemen-
tation” or “process” analysis, which requires collecting detailed 
information on the program from program manuals, training materials, 
and budgets; interviewing both managers and frontline program staff; 
observing service provision; and talking with participants. If an impact 
is found, this information is important for replication. If no impact is 
found, or the impact is smaller than expected, this information will 
allow the evaluator to determine whether this was because the interven-
tion was not implemented, because it was not implemented as designed, 
or because it was ineffective. 
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Finally, information on the cost of the program can be used to in-
terpret the magnitude of a program impact and to inform others who 
may be considering replications of the program. A program may have 
positive impacts on earnings, but may not be cost-effective if its costs 
are high. Conversely, a low-cost intervention may be cost-effective 
even if it has modest impacts. With cost data, a benefi t-cost analysis 
can be conducted that compares the cost of the intervention with the 
monetary value of the benefi ts of the employment services. The largest 
benefi t of employment services is typically the increase in participants’ 
earnings after they leave the program, which is already measured in 
dollars. Other potential benefi ts from participation in employment ser-
vices, such as any reduction in public assistance use or crime, can be 
valued in dollars (see, for example, McConnell and Glazerman [2001]). 
In evaluations where it is diffi cult to place dollar values on program 
benefi ts (so that benefi t-cost analyses are not possible), some research-
ers instead conduct cost-effectiveness studies where they compare the 
key impact estimates with the per-participant program costs. Benefi ts 
and costs are examined from different perspectives—usually society 
as a whole, taxpayers, the program’s funder, and participants. Benefi t-
cost analysis is useful for comparing interventions to each other, and 
for identifying those interventions that improve participants’ outcomes 
most effi ciently.      
RECOMMENDATIONS
First, we urge the EU to invest in data collection for evaluating pro-
gram impacts. As well as collecting baseline and outcomes data, data 
should also be collected on costs, the implementation of the program, 
and the receipt of services by members of both treatment and control/
comparison groups.
Second, we recommend that the EU consider conducting experi-
ments. While not always possible, there are many situations in which 
they can be done and can yield rigorous fi ndings. They need not be 
large or expensive.
Third, if experiments are not feasible, we recommend that rigorous 
nonexperimental methods be used, such as regression discontinuity or 
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propensity score matching methods. However, it is critical that these 
methods be carefully selected and applied to ensure that potential sam-
ple selection biases can be overcome to yield credible impact estimates.
Finally, we recommend that the EU invest in conducting rigorous 
impact evaluation, whether experimental or not. The stakes for the tax-
payers, the participants, and the health of the economy are too high for 
labor market policies not to be based on strong evidence.
Notes
1. The USDOL contracted with Mathematica Policy Research to conduct the WIA 
Adult and Dislocated Worker Program Evaluation.
2. The Poverty Action Lab at MIT (www.povertyactionlab.org/papers) has conducted 
numerous experiments in developing countries.
3. Instrumental variables methods are important in experiments when members of 
the treatment group do not receive the treatment or when control group members 
receive the intervention being tested (Heckman et al. 1998). 
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